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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS APPELLANT 
-ooOoo-
STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 
(1) The Plaintiff below in this action, GARY S. EGAN, is 
the Respondent and Cross Appellant on this appeal. GARY S. 
EGAN was the Defendant in the case of Nancy Lee Egan v. 
Gary S. Egan, Docket No. D-14489, a divorce action filed in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, a case to which the present case is corollary. 
(2) The Defendant below in this action, NANCY LEE EGAN, 
is the Appellant and Cross Appellee on this appeal. NANCY 
LEE EGAN was the Plaintiff in the divorce action of Nancy 
Lee Egan v. Gary S. Egan (cited supra). 
2. NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This appeal arises from a judgment entered following a 
trial before the Civil Division of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., District Judge, presiding, 
wherein GARY S. EGAN brought an INDEPENDENT ACTION pursuant 
to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for relief 
from a default judgment entered in Civil Action D-14489, a 
divorce case. The Trial Court found in favor of Plaintiff 
GARY S. EGAN (Respondent here) and entered judgment granting 
only partial relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)&(7) U.R.C.P. 
from the prior Divorce Decree. From that final order, the 
Defendant below, NANCY LEE EGAN, appeals and the Plaintiff 
below, GARY S. EGAN, cross-appeals. 
3. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL. 
(1) On Appeal: 
Whether the Trial Court erred in granting 
partial relief from the prior judgment. 
(2) On Cross Appeal: 
Whether the Trial Court erred in failing 
to grant complete relief from the default 
judgment as sought by the Plaintiff below. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
On November 5, 197 5, Plaintiff-Respondent GARY S. EGAN's 
Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. Independent Action For Relief From Judg-
ment came on for non-jury trial before the Civil Di-
vision of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
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Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff-Respondent GARY S. EGAN 
sought relief from a default Divorce Decree made and entered 
on September 11, 1974 by the Domestic Relations Division of 
the same district in Civil Action D-14489, Honorable Peter F. 
Leary, District Judge, presiding. After a two-and-one-half 
day trial and the parties having concluded their evidence, 
the Trial Court requested counsel to submit Memoranda of 
Points and Authorities on various issues of law raised 
during trial. 
On January 20, 1976, after a series of post-trial motions 
and oral arguments, the Trial Court entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, finding that the underlying SETTLE-
MENT AGREEMENT entered into between the parties (dated 
September 14, 1974)(R.3) was void by reason that it was 
based upon an erroneous assumption and mutual mistake of fact 
(i.e. that the child Melinda Sarah Egan was his biological 
child, when in fact she was not.) (Findings of Fact 1(17) (R. 135) 
(Conclusions of Law 1[2)(R.136) 
Accordingly, on January 20, 197 6, the Trial Court entered 
a judgment granting only partial relief from the prior 
Divorce Decree relieving the Plaintiff GARY S. EGAN from 
the further support of the child MELINDA SARAH EGAN and de-
leting all reference to the child from the Divorce Decree. 
From that judgment, NANCY LEE EGAN appeals and GARY S. EGAN 
cross appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant NANCY LEE EGAN seeks a reversal of the 
Trial Court's judgment granting partial relief from judgment 
requesting this Court to reinstate the terms of the original 
Divorce Decree requiring GARY S. EGAN to support the child 
MELINDA SARAH EGAN- The Respondent and Cross Appellant 
GARY S. EGAN seeks: 
(1) an equitable review of both the facts and 
the law pursuant to Rule 72(a) U.R.C.P.; 
(2) that the Court set aside the entire Decree 
of Divorce, except for that portion dissolving 
the marriage; and 
(3) for an order remanding the divorce action 
to the Domestic Relations Division for trial 
upon the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
GARY S. EGAN and NANCY LEE EGAN were married to each 
other on November 18, 1964 in Salt Lake City, Utah (R.13). 
The marriage lasted some nine and one half years; one child, 
Allison Egan, age 11, was born the legitimate issue of the 
marriage (R.6). In early May of 1974, the parties separ-
ated and on May 28, 1974 NANCY LEE EGAN filed a Complaint 
for absolute divorce. Although living separately, both 
parties testified to having sexual relations together 
during the month of June 1974 (TR.25&76). The Defendant 
NANCY LEE EGAN also testified that she had sexual relations 
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with another man, not her husband, during the month of June 
1974 (TR.77-78). In July of 1974, NANCY LEE EGAN learned 
that she was pregnant with another child and filed an Affi-
davit with the Court dated August 5, 1974 stating that: 
"Another child to be born of the marriage is expected in 
February 1975." (TR.82 & Plaintiff's Ex. 11). NANCY LEE EGAN 
informed the Plaintiff GARY S. EGAN that the unborn child 
was his child and there is no conflict in the testimony that 
she reassured him of the fact that the expected child was in 
fact his child on a number of subsequent occasions (TR.30, 
55,62,69,70,102,104,108). The parties discussed reconcilia-
tion and settlement throughout the month of August and the 
first half of September 1974; however, on September 16, 1974, 
based upon NANCY EGAN!s representations as to the paternity 
of the unborn child, GARY EGAN entered into a STIPULATION & 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (R.16) and signed an APPEARANCE AND 
CONSENT TO DEFAULT so that the divorce could proceed by 
default and without contest (TR.6, Ex.P-10). Thereafter on 
September 19, 1974, the Court approved the STIPULATION & 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT and entered default judgment and final 
Decree of Divorce based upon and in accordance with its 
terms (R.6-23). 
On or about September 20, 1974, immediately after NANCY's 
Court appearance on the default divorce and after the final 
Decree had been entered, NANCY and GARY EGAN went to lunch 
—^The divorce became final upon entry of the Decree (R.6,^1) 
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together at Auerbach's tea room (TR.43). During lunch, NANCY 
EGAN informed GARY EGAN for the first time of the possibility 
that the child then in gestation may not be his (TR.38,42,43) . 
GARY EGAN testified that he was not certain of her motives for 
telling him this, but when the child was born on March 28, 1975 
and he had an opportunity to observe the child, he became 
convinced for the first time that the infant Melinda Sarah 
Egan was in fact not his child (R.61). Immediately thereafter 
GARY EGAN contacted Dr. Charles D. Scott, Medical Geneticist, 
for expert advice as to the determination of paternity. Dr. 
Scott suggested GARY retain legal counsel without delay. EGAN 
did so and on June 30, 1975, an independent action was brought 
for relief from judgment in accordance with Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. 
(R.l). At trial upon the merits two of the three blood group 
examinations ordered by the Court prior to trial were admitted 
into evidence, both of which positively excluded GARY STEWART 
EGAN from paternity (R.132). The two blood tests admitted at 
trial were conducted pursuant to Plaintiff's motion under 
§ 78-25-18 Utah Code Annotated (1953)(R.70), the one remaining 
test conducted upon Defendant's motion was not offered by her 
counsel at time of trial (TR.86). Based upon extrinsic evi-
dence in accordance with Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 
P.2d 687 (1974), the Court thereupon made the finding that 
the child Melinda Sarah Egan was not the natural and bio-
logical child of the Plaintiff GARY S. EGAN nor the legitimate 
issue of the marriage (Finding of Fact 1(4 and Conclusion of 
Law H3, R.132). 
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Although the Trial Court did find that the child Melinda 
Sarah Egan was conclusively proved, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, not to be the child of GARY S. EGAN, the Court found 
that the representations of paternity made by NANCY LEE EGAN 
to GARY S. EGAN did not constitute fraud, but were made under 
a mistaken belief and upon an erroneous assumption (Conclusion 
of Law 1(2, R.136) . 
Accordingly, the Court found that the Contract or SET-
TLEMENT AGREEMENT entered into by the parties (dated September 
16, 1974) was based upon a mutual mistake of fact and the 
erroneous assumption that the child Melinda S. Egan (born 
after the divorce became final) was the child of the Plain-
tiff GARY S. EGAN; and that the AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT was 
therefore void or voidable (Finding of Fact 1(17, R.135). 
Based upon the finding that the underlying Contract or AGREEMENT 
OF SETTLEMENT was void, the Court granted partial rescission 
of the Agreement and entered a judgment granting partial re-
lief from the future application of the judgment (viz. the 
support terms of the judgment) pursuant to Rule 60(b) (6)&(7) , 
the Court finding that it was no longer equitable that the 
judgment have prospective application (R.139). 
On appeal, the Defendant NANCY LEE EGAN claims in the 
absence of an express finding of fraud on her part the Trial 
Court erred in granting the Plaintiff partial relief from a 
judgment requiring the support of a child even though the 
child is admittedly not the child of GARY EGAN- The 
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Plaintiff GARY S. EGAN contends the Court's action was not an 
abuse of discretion, but asserts the entire Agreement was based 
upon a false and erroneous assumption that the child was his 
and that NANCY had been a true and faithful wife, that the en-
tire Agreement should be set aside and the entire matter should 
be remanded to the Family Relations Division for hearing, the 
matter not having been previously litigated as the Divorce 
Decree was taken by default. 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT ON APPELLANT'S APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IS VESTED WITH BROAD DISCRETION IN GRANTING 
RULE 60(b) (5) (6)&(7) RELIEF AND THE COURT'S JUDGMENT WAS NOT 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
At the outset it should be noted that the Appellant 
NANCY LEE EGAN made no claim at trial and makes no claim 
on this appeal that the child MELINDA SARAH EGAN is the child 
of GARY S. EGAN. She does admit that she misled him during 
settlement negotiation (TR.108) but contends that because 
he did not discover that the child was not his child before 
three months had elapsed, that he should be responsible for 
the lifetime support of another man's child. 
Such a contention before a court of equity seems incredi-
ble if not preposterous. Why she does not seek support from 
the child's real father is not known, but in all events, that 
question is not before the Court on this appeal. 
1. Relief under Rule 60(b) is not limited to three 
months under the sections applicable here. 
In Points I & II of pages 7 and 9 of NANCY LEE EGAN's 
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Brief, the Appellant advances the argument that the three 
month limitation on bringing a Rule 60(b) motion under sub-
sections (1),(2),(3)&(4) somehow prevents a party from being 
entitled to relief under subsections 60(b) (5) (6)& (7) in the 
event the party seeking the relief from judgment should also 
bring an Independent Action for relief as prescribed in 
Rule 60(b). 
The complete text of Rule 60(b) reads as follows: 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; 
Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud; Etc, On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order 
or proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence 
could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the de-
fendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant 
has failed to appear in said action; (5) the judg-
ment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released or discharged, or a prior judgment has 
been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is not longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective applica-
tion; or (7) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1),(2),(3), or (4), not more than 3 months 
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve 
a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or 
by an independent action. Id. Rule 60(b) (Emphasis 
Supplied) 
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It is clear from a reading of the Rule that there is no 
time limitation on relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5)(6)or(7), 
nor is there any time limitation upon bringing an Independent 
Action other than "within a reasonable time". Appellant's 
position, if it is understood correctly, is that a moving 
party cannot bring one single action seeking relief from 
judgment under 60(b)(5)(6)or(7) if "fraud upon the court" 
is one of his legal theories, but must instead bring two 
separate actions, i.e. one by motion under subsections (5), 
(6)&(7) in the original proceeding and a second by way of 
Independent Action in a totally separate proceeding or suit in 
equity. 
Under Appellant's theory, the party seeking relief would 
have to duplicate legal expenses, witness, testimony, experts, 
evidence, legal argument, etc. in each action. 
Such a duplicative procedure would indeed be a novel 
approach to litigation, as usually the courts are concerned 
with such items as time, expense and efficient utilization 
of judicial resources, etc. 
There is no question but that an action sounding in fraud 
upon the Court under Rule 60(b) must be brought in an Inde-
pendent Action, but nothing in the language of the Rule sug-
gests a limitation on a party's ability to seek relief under 
alternative theories pursuant to subsections 60(b) (5) (6)& (7) 
at the same time and in the same action. 
In fact, the language of the Rule stated in the dis-
junctive "or" rather than in the conjunctive "and" suggests 
exactly the opposite, for example, the last two lines of 
-10-
Rule 60(b) read as follows: 
"This rule does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or 
by an independent action." (Emphasis added) 
The use of the disjunctive word "or" suggests that after 
the initial three month limitation has past, an action for 
relief from judgment under subsections (5)(6)&(7) may be 
brought either by motion in the original action or together 
with other equitable theories in a Separate Suit In Equity 
under the Rule 60(b) "Independent Action" clause. 
Justice Ellett's concurring opinion in McGavin v. McGavin, 
27 Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972) as well as the Court's 
unanimous decision in Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 
P.2d 949 (1959) lead one to conclude that after the three 
month period has expired, a party would most prudently bring 
his Rule 60(b) action for relief from judgment by way of a 
Separate Suit In Equity. Rule 60 (b) (5) (6)& (7) being the 
equitable provisions of the Rule, (see Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741,742 (1953)), it seems only sensi-
ble that all equitable claims be joined in the same action 
rather than instituting two different actions at the same 
time. 
POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS ON AT LEAST FIVE 
PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SUSTAINED RULE 60(b) RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
BASED UPON "MISTAKE OF FACT" OR "ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION" LONG 
AFTER THE THREE MONTH LIMITATION HAD EXPIRED. 
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This Court is currently considering the question of 
whether the Trial Court erred in granting Plaintiff GARY 
STEWART EGAN relief from the "prospective application" of 
the default judgment ordering him to pay $125.00 per month 
for the support of a child Melinda Egan, a child which the 
Trial Court positively determined not to be the child of the 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff contended that the judgment was based 
upon fraud, mistake or the "erroneous assumption" on the 
part of all parties that the child was the child of the 
parties when in fact subsequent events proved that it is not. 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the relief granted pursuant to 
Rules 60(b) (6)&(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
provide as follows: 
"The court may in the furtherance of justice re-
lieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . • 
for the following reasons: 
(6) . . . it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." (Emphasis supplied) 
The Appellant NANCY LEE EGAN, by her Brief, would have 
this Court believe that either the Trial Court did not have 
such power or that the provisions of Section 60(b) (6)& (7) are 
inapposite to the case presently at Bar. Appellant's Brief 
cites selected Utah cases decided under Rule 60(b) and then 
alludes to cases decided under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure for support. As a reading of the cases cited in Ap-
pellant's Brief discloses/there is nothing even remotely 
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bearing upon the issue now before the Court; however, at the 
outset, one important distinction should be noted: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide a time period of one year 
from entry of judgment in which to bring a motion for relief 
from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1), (2), (3)& (4), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, whereas the Utah Rules require 
that such a Motion be brought within three months from date 
of judgment; furthermore, the Federal Courts do not become 
involved in domestic relations law. For these two reasons, 
the equitable considerations involved between the State and 
Federal Courts are quite different. 
This Brief shall concern itself strictly and exclusively 
with the law of the State of Utah and decided only under 
Rule 60(b) (6)&(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
particularly focus upon judgments that were entered based 
upon "erroneous assumptions" or predicated upon a defective 
understanding of the attendant facts. These cases unques-
tionably stand for the proposition that Rule 60(b) (6)& (7) 
is a broad grant of equitable power which is given to the 
District Court in order to interdict an otherwise unjust or 
unconscionable result brought about by reason of a prior 
and final judgment. 
The first case on point of Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 Utah 
2d 156, 506 P.2d 74 (1973) is a case that does appear in the 
annotations of the Utah Code immediately following Rule 60(b), 
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but which was left out of Appellant's scholarly summary of 
cases. In Stewart, Plaintiff's counsel mistakenly believed 
that he had answered Defendant's Interrogatories, when in 
fact he had not. Consequently, Plaintiff's Complaint was 
dismissed with prejudice under Rule 37 for failure to make 
discovery. Some thirteen months later, Plaintiff retained 
new counsel and moved the Trial Court to grant relief from 
the thirteen month old Judgment of Dismissal with prejudice 
and to modify said judgment to provide for dismissal without 
prejudice in order that a new action could be filed. Judge 
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. granted the motion for relief from 
judgment and modified the existing order and the Defendant 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. In sustaining the Trial 
Court's granting of relief from prior judgment and subsequent 
modification of the order, the Utah Supreme Court held per 
Justice Tuckett: 
"The provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) are sufficiently 
broad to permit the Court to set aside its former 
order which appeared to have been entered upon an 
'erroneous assumption' and to enter a new order 
based upon the record before it." (Emphasis Sup-
plied) (Id. at 506 P.2d 76.) 
A second Utah case (involving an erroneous assumption) 
not mentioned in Appellant's Brief is Kelly v. Scott, 5 Utah 
2d 159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956). In the Kelly case, a real estate 
broker sued a seller for his real estate commission earned 
in connection with the sale of the seller's house and took 
judgment against the seller. Some eleven months later the 
seller sued the purchaser of the house for failure to perform 
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the sales agreement. The Trial Court determined the real es-
tate sales contract to be void and unenforceable by reason of 
a failure of a condition precedent. The Trial Court then on 
motion of the seller granted him relief from the eleven month 
old judgment in favor of the real estate broker because the 
judgment had been entered upon the "erroneous assumption" 
that there was in existence a valid and enforceable real es-
tate sales contract, when in fact, there was not. The real 
estate broker, on a subsequent motion to the Trial Court, 
persuaded the Court, Judge Ellett, to reinstate the judgment 
for his sales commission. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the Trial Court,holding: 
"It is clear that the judgment for the [broker] 
• • • was predicated on the belief by both 
parties before the court that an enforceable 
contract between the [purchasers] and [sellers] 
existed. Under these circumstances, the Judgment 
should have been vacated in its entirety pur-
suant to the motion made by Appellant in ac-
cordance with Rule 60(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . ." Id. at 298 P.2d 823. [Emphasis 
Supplied] 
In Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 115 (1956), 
a divorced husband and wife were sued by (the assignee of) 
a real estate broker for a sales commission earned in 
selling their apartment house. The wife erroneously be-
lieved that her husband had the responsibility of defending 
her in the action and failed to answer. Subsequently, a 
default judgment was taken against her. Some eleven months 
later she moved the Court for relief from the judgment and 
the Trial Court set the judgment aside. On appeal, the 
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Utah Supreme Court through Justice Crockett affirmed the Trial 
Court's granting relief from judgment eleven months later and 
held: 
"Defendant did not request relief until nearly 11 
months had elapsed and hence, the only applicable 
section of Rule 60(b) upon which she could rely 
was (7). [Defendant's] motion was supported by 
an affidavit in which the major ground for relief 
was that she had mistakenly believed that she was 
fully protected by a divorce decree ordering her 
ex-husband to pay any real estate commission 
arising from the sale of the apartments. 
Plaintiff argues that this is a mistake of law 
and not within the purview of Rule 60(b) . . . 
The trial court could well record this as among 
the class of cases that Rule 60(b)(7) was in-
tended to govern and to permit [Defendant] to 
justify her failure to answer on the ground that 
the divorce decree required her husband to bear 
the obligation and required him to defend the 
action for her. Id. at 299 P.2d 1116" [Emphasis 
supplied] 
In the Utah case of Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 
1211 (1952), the parties to a divorce action stipulated to 
the entry of a temporary order. Several months later, one 
of the counsel for the parties "erroneously believing" that 
the stipulation was a final one prepared a Final Order in 
accordance with the Stipulation and had it entered by the 
Court. The Plaintiff moved for relief from the Judgment 
after the three month motion period had expired. The 
Trial Court granted relief to the Plaintiff pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(7) and the Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court 
affirmed and held: 
"The record . . . clearly indicates that the 
signing and entry of such formal Order was 
done upon the "erroneous assumption" that it 
conformed to a direction of the Court . . . 
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In light of the allegations of Plaintiffs petition 
requesting that it be set aside, it would work 
upon her a grave injustice to permit the order 
to stand. Under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P., a Judgment 
or Order may be set aside for any reason other 
than those specified in reasons 1 to 6 "Justi-
fying Relief From the Operation of The Judgment" 
if the motion is made within a reasonable time . . . 
Furthermore, in the absence of a rule to that 
effect the court perhaps had an inherent power 
to set the former order aside. See, In Re Evans, 
42 Utah 282, 130 p. 217." (Id. at 240 P.2d 1213, 
14.) (Emphasis Supplied) 
The Dixon v. Dixon case clearly demonstrates the breadth 
of the Court's equitable power in the last line of the case 
quoted. 
Finally, the case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 123 Utah 416, 
260 P.2d 741, 742 (1953) carefully outlines the equitable 
power and discretion of the Court in granting relief from 
unjust, unfair or inequitable judgments. In Dixon Ranch, 
the Court per Justice McDonough stated with respect to 
Rule 60(b): 
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a 
creature of equity designed to relieve against the 
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may 
occur through procedural difficulties, the 
wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes 
which prevent the presentation of a claim or 
defense. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure outlines the situations wherein a 
party may be relieved from a final judgment, 
among which is mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect claimed hereby the ap-
pellant. Equity considers factors which may 
be irrelevant in actions at law, such as the 
unfairness of a party's conduct, his delay in 
bringing or continuing the action, the hardship 
in granting or denying relief. Although an 
equity court no longer has complete discretion 
in granting or denying relief it may exercise 
wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors 
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of fairness and public convenience, and this court 
on appeal will reverse the trial court only where 
an abuse of this discretion is clearly shown. 
Salt Lake Hardware Co. v. Nielson Land & Water Co., 
43 Utah 406f 134 P. 911; McWhirter v. Donaldson, 
36 Utah 293, 104 P. 731." 
From a brief survey of the Utah cases turning upon the 
issue of relief from prior judgments pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
(6)&(7), U.R.C.P., two concrete conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Rule 60(b) (6)&(7) are a broad and plenary 
grant of equitable power which enables the Court 
to do whatever it deems necessary to do justice 
between the parties; and 
2. whatever decision the Trial Court comes to 
with respect to granting or withholding relief 
from judgment will not usually be disturbed by 
the Supreme Court on Appeal, except where a clear 
abusive discretion is shown. 
Applying the law announced in the above cited cases to the 
facts of the Egan case, the case at Bar, some undisputed 
premises can be stated. 
1. The child Melinda Sarah Egan is not the bio-
logical offspring of the Plaintiff GARY EGAN.(R.134,K4&136K3) 
2. The Plaintiff GARY EGAN has paid 
some $1,87 5.00 in child support for the child 
to date, plus he has been ordered to pay an 
additional $900.00 in hospital bills incurred 
by reason of the child's birth. (R.7) 
3. Unless this Court sustains the prospective 
relief from the future application of this 
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judgment granted by the Trial Court, GARY EGAN will 
pay NANCY EGAN $27,000.00 over the next 18 years 
as child support for a child that is not his. (R.6&7) 
4. The Trial Court, pursuant to a separate suit 
in equity for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), 
has found on the basis of equity that EGAN is en-
titled to relief from the future application of 
judgment. (R.137) 
5. The Stipulation, Waiver and Consent to Default 
was made and entered upon mistaken belief or er-
roneous assumption of fact that the child was his 
biological offspring (TR.120). 
6. At the time the Stipulation and Consent to 
Default were entered, EGAN had no opportunity to 
learn the true facts and no opportunity to learn 
the true facts was available until March 28, 1975 
when the child was born, which was six months 
after the Divorce Decree was entered. (TR.82) 
7. EGAN brought his action for relief from judg-
ment within nine months after entry of the Decree 
and within three months after the child was born 
and it first became possible to take a blood sample 
from the child in order to determine true paternity* 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Courts 
of the State of Utah have granted,and the Supreme Court on 
Appeal has affirmed, relief from the future application of a 
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final judgment in cases much less egregious than the EGAN 
case. "Mistaken belief" or "erroneous assumption" has served 
as a basis for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) (6)& (7) 
in at least five prior Utah cases cited above in this Re-
spondent's Brief; to~wit: 
Where the parties believed a contract to be valid and en-
forceable when in fact it was not, the Supreme Court affirmed 
60(b)(6) relief from judgment 11 months later. Kelly v. Scott, 
supra. 
Where the lawyer for a party mistakenly believed he had 
answered interrogatories, the Supreme Court affirmed 60(b)(7) 
relief 13 months later. Stewart v. Sullivan, supra. 
Where a woman erroneously believed her husband would de-
fend an action for her, the Court granted 60(b)(7) relief 11 
months later. Ney v. Harrison, supra. 
Where a temporary Stipulation & Settlement Agreement was 
mistaken for a final one, the Court sustained Rule 60(b) 
relief granted 9 months later. Dixon v. Dixon, supra, etc. 
Certainly, if those cases constitute a sufficient basis 
for Rule 60(b) (6)& (7) relief from judgment, an error in be-
lief or erroneous assumption as substantial as the paternity 
or non-paternity of a child and the responsibility for its 
lifetime support is a much stronger reason to grant relief 
indeed. 
The Plaintiff EGAN requests the Court to consider the 
equities attendant in the present action and sustain the 
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relief granted by the Trial Court from the future or "pro-
spective application of judgment" under Rule 60(b)(6) or for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
judgment" under Rule 60(b)(7). 
To deny EGAN relief and allow the judgment based on error 
to stand will not do justice between the parties and will 
bring about an unconscionable and unjust result that will 
continue for the next 17 years. 
POINT III 
ALL ISSUES UPON WHICH THE COURT BASED ITS DECISION WERE RAISED 
IN THE PLEADINGS AND ALL ISSUES WERE TRIED WITH THE FULL KNOW-
LEDGE, CONSENT AND PARTICIPATION OF THE APPELLANT. 
1. The issue of negligent misrepresentation or mistaken 
misrepresentation was raised in the pleadings. 
The Appellant's Brief at Point III claims error by reason 
that the Trial Court failed to grant relief on the basis of 
fraud, but instead bottomed its judgment upon erroneous as-
sumption and mutual mistake of fact. The Appellant claims 
that the issue of mistake was never raised in the pleadings 
and that he had no opportunity to meet and defend against such 
an issue during time of the trial. Appellant's contention 
finds no basis in fact. Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires: "a short, plain statement of the claim 
showing the pleader is entitled to relief." 
The Plaintiff's original verified Complaint filed in this 
action in the second opening paragraph states: 2. "That this 
Action for Relief from judgment . . . is brought pursuant to 
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and in accordance with Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." (R.l at \\2) In paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Com-
plaint, Plaintiff set forth that one of the bases of his 
claim for relief from judgment was the "negligent misrepre-
sentation of a material fact," (R.3,^12) 
Rule 60(b) contains seven subsections upon which relief 
can be granted which include: 
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, etc.; 
(2) newly discovered evidence etc.; 
(3) fraud . . . misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when . . . the summons in an action has 
not been personally served upon the de-
fendant etc. ; 
(5) the judgment is void; 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied . . . or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. 
The Defendant was certainly on notice of what issues were 
to be raised and litigated at time of trial as they were set 
forth with great detail in the Complaint. 
Secondly, the Plaintiff, in accordance with the strict 
requirement of Rule 9(b) U.R.C.P. set forth and plead the 
issue of fraud with "particularity" as defined in Pace v. 
Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1953), all other claims 
were averred generally. [See 1[11 (1) through (9) ] 
One can scarcely conceive of any more simple and 
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plain statement of what the Plaintiff intended to allege, 
raise and prove at trial. 
A negligent misrepresentation of a material fact is a 
false statement of fact based not upon a conscious intention 
to deceive, but upon a mistake or erroneous assumption about 
the true state of the facts. PROSSER, The Law of Torts, 3d 
ed. § 100 misrepresentation and mistake P. 701 (1964). 
Finally, at the conclusion of trial, the Court requested 
counsel for each of the parties to submit memoranda of law 
on several points, one of the points requested by the Trial 
Court was whether the Court could grant relief from judgment 
on a showing of anything less than actionable fraud (R.84, 
101,107). Defendant's counsel was given notice and oppor-
tunity to brief and argue the point prior to judgment on 
that occasion as well. 
2. The Appellant has failed to demonstrate what evidence 
or points were not adduced by reason of the Court's finding 
of mistake instead of fraud. 
The Appellant contends she was not able to meet or de-
fend against the issue of mistaken misrepresentation or er-
roneous assumption at time of trial; however, no mention is 
made of the manner in which she was prejudiced, what evidence 
was not heard by the Court, how the trial would have been 
conducted differently, or how a different result might have 
been reached. 
Negligent misrepresentation or mistaken representation of 
material fact is certainly a lesser included element of an 
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allegation of fraud lacking only the requirement of a con-
scious intention. PROSSER, The Law of Torts, 3d. ed. § 100 
misrepresentation and mistake (1964). 
Surely it cannot be seriously contended that NANCY EGAN 
was not grossly mistaken when she assured GARY EGAN on numerous 
occasions (TR.30,55,62,69,70,102,104,108) that the child to 
be born was his child. The Court found absolutely without 
question that it was not his child and Appellant does not 
even now contend that it is. NANCY EGAN herself testified 
that she told GARY EGAN the child was his because she thought 
it was (R.108). That statement, being admittedly false, if 
not conscious fraud, can only then be a mistake. 
Finally, for the sake of examining Appellantfs argument 
only, how could NANCY EGAN have testified differently, given 
that Plaintiff sought rescission by reason of honest mistake 
rather than intentional fraud. What possible different 
questions could have been asked of GARY EGAN on cross-
examination to defend against an allegation of mistaken 
belief rather than intentional deceit. There is no alle-
gation that a mistake had not, in fact been made, but only 
that Defendant would have conducted her case differently 
to defend against mistake as opposed to fraud. The Ap-
pellant has not, however, advised the Court how the evidence 
would have been different or what evidence for this reason did not 
-24-
come to light. The Appellant does not quarrel with the facts 
as the Court found them or allege they are different from the 
Plaintiff's version/ but only that the defense of the case 
would have been different, if NANCY EGAN had been defending 
against a less difficult case for the Plaintiff to prove.. 
Appellant's argument seems a non sequitur for the reason that 
it is. 
ARGUMENT ON RESPONDENT'S CROSS APPEAL 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
THE RESPONDENT AND CROSS APPELLANT DID PROVE EACH AND EVERY 
ELEMENT OF FRAUD AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE ENTIRE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND COMPLETE RELIEF FROM THE ENTIRE 
DIVORCE DECREE. 
This is not a case where the Appellant asks the Supreme 
Court on appeal to retry the case on the record, to believe 
the testimony of his witnesses and disbelieve the testimony 
of the opponent's witnesses in contravention to the findings 
of the Trial Court. The Cross Appellant is well aware of the 
futility of that approach periodically taken by disgruntled 
litigants whose cases are replete throughout the reporting 
system. The Cross Appellant would not waste his time nor the 
Court's with such an appeal. 
This case is unique in that there are no facts or testi-
mony in dispute. The Trial Court was not faced with accepting 
or rejecting the testimony of either party. It did not have 
to believe one party and disbelieve another as the evidence 
was consistent in all respects. The reason the Cross Appellant 
seeks equitable review of both the law and the facts pursuant 
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to Rule 72(a) U.R.C.P. is that as each and every element of 
fraud was proved and no dispute in the testimony existed, the 
Trial Court could not reasonably find any other way under 
the present state of the case law; or in short, the Trial 
Court could not reasonably draw the inferences that it did 
given the state of the objective facts developed at trial. 
The case of Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 
(1952) has long been the definitive case on the law of fraud 
in the State of Utah. 
Applying the nine elements set forth in Pace v. Parrish 
to the undisputed facts of the case, the Respondent and Cross 
Appellant requests that this Court on review see if it can 
draw the same inferences and conclusions from the objective 
and uncontroverted facts as did the Trial Court. 
(1) That a representation was made; 
No dispute on the representation, both parties 
testified the same: that NANCY LEE EGAN told GARY 
S. EGAN that she was pregnant with a child in July 
of 1974 and repeatedly assured him that the child 
was his continuously from July through September 
19, 1974 (TR.30,55,62,69,70,102,104,108). 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact; 
No dispute in testimony here, both parties 
testified to the same thing. NANCY EGAN told GARY 
EGAN she was then pregnant with his child (TR.30, 
55,62,69,7 0,102,104,108). 
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(3) which was false; 
No dispute here. The Trial Court found that the 
child was positively not the child of GARY EGAN based 
upon two separate blood tests (R.134 1(4, 136 1[3) . 
(4) which the representator either 
(a) Knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that she had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation. 
No dispute in the testimony on this point. NANCY testi-
fied at trial that during the month of June 1974, while she 
was living apart from her husband, she had sexual relations 
with another man, not her husband (TR.77&78) 
Moreover, thereafter on September 20, 1974, the day after 
the Divorce Decree had been entered (the divorce became final 
upon entry) NANCY told GARY for the very first time that she 
did not know whose child it was that she was carrying (TR.43) 
and that such knowledge was weighing heavily on her mind 
(TR.43). 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other person to act 
upon it; 
There is no dispute on the issue of intention to induce 
GARY EGAN to rely on NANCY!s representations that Melinda 
was GARY'S child, as under direct examination by her own 
counsel, in answer to his question: 
"What was the purpose of your telling Gary that 
it was his child?" 
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Answer: "I don't understand." 
"Why did you tell Gary he was the father of the child?" 
Answer: "Because I thought Gary Egan was the father." 
(TR.108) 
(6) That the other party acting reasonably and in ig-
norance of its falsity; 
No dispute that it is reasonable for man to believe his 
wife when she tells him she is pregnant with his child; 
moreover, not only GARY, BUT NANCY herself testified that 
GARY EGAN had no way of knowing that the child was not his 
child. (TR.83). NANCY also testified that GARY seemed to 
believe her when she told him the child was his (TR.83). 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
The proof that GARY EGAN relied upon NANCYfs statements 
as to paternity is better than mere testimony, he signed an 
AGREEMENT to pay $125.00 per month for eighteen years to 
support the child (R.16). 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
No dispute that GARY acted by entering into the AGREEMENT 
to pay his wife child support for the child to be born and to 
pay the hospital bills incurred in connection with its birth 
(R.16) or that he actually performed the terms of the AGREE-
MENT (TR.9,10&11). 
(9) to his injury and damage; 
It is undisputed that GARY EGAN has paid support for the 
child of $1,800.00, paid all hospital expenses incurred in 
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connection with the birth of $900.00, agreed to pay his 
former wife $470.00 per month and given up his right to appear 
in Court to contest the issues raised in the divorce com-
plaint, all on the assumption that the child was his and he 
had the responsibility for its support and maintenance. (TR.9-13) 
The above cited paragraphs and citations to the tran-
script and record reflect the undisputed testimony at time 
of trial. This evidence is not controverted, the facts are 
objective and both parties testified to the same thing; 
nevertheless, the Trial Court found as follows: That NANCY 
LEE EGAN did not act recklessly knowing that she had in-
sufficient knowledge and that GARY EGAN did not reasonably 
rely upon her representations to him (Findings of Fact R.134). 
The facts are not disputed, only the inferences drawn 
from the facts by the Trial Court are challenged on this 
appeal. 
In all candor, can reasonable minds differ that if a woman 
who admittedly had sexual intercourse with two men during 
the same month and who felt the need to confess her deep con-
cern over the paternity of the child to her husband the day 
after the Divorce Decree was entered, did not that person 
have the very same concerns the day before the Decree Wcis 
entered when her husband questioned her specifically on the 
very point of paternity. And if she had such doubts about 
paternity, did she not represent material facts to her husband 
"upon insufficient knowledge to base such a representation", 
in accordance with Element No. 4(b) of Pace v. Parrish, supra; 
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The Trial Court's conclusion, that NANCY EGANfs represen-
tations as to paternity were made for two months upon blithe 
naivete1 up until the Decree was entered, and then suddenly 
the very next day lightning struck and she realized for the 
very first time that the child may not be her husband's, is 
ridiculous. 
The same kind of reasoning applies to the Court's finding 
that GARY EGAN did not rely upon NANCYfs representations. 
Actions speak much louder than words and GARY'S execution of 
the SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT conclusively proves that he believed 
NANCY and that he relied upon what she told him. Elsewise, 
why would he have signed an AGREEMENT to pay $27,000.00. 
If based upon the undisputed testimony of the parties, 
GARY EGAN did not prove fraud and the Trial Court's con-
clusions drawn from the objective facts are sustained by this 
Court on appeal, then fraud cannot be proved in Utah without 
the admission of the party who perpetrated the fraud that he 
specifically intended to defraud the individual injured. It 
is submitted that that is a case we shall never live to see. 
This is a case where the facts as established at trial simply 
do not support the Court's conclusions. 
As stated, the Cross Appellant does not ask the reviewing 
Court to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, to believe 
his witnesses and disbelieve the witnesses of the Defendant. 
On the contrary, he requests this Court to review the undis-
puted facts to see whether they square with the conclusions 
drawn by the Trial Court. It is respectfully submitted that 
they do not. 
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POINT V 
THE PLAINTIFF GARY EGAN HAS PLEAD AND PROVED ACTIONABLE COMMON 
LAW FRAUD ENTITLING HIM TO FULL RESCISSION ON THE AGREEMENT. 
The Utah law is undisputed that the burden is upon the 
Plaintiff to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidencef 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952). The Utah 
Supreme Court has refined the definition of clear and con-
vincing in the case of C.LT. Credit Corp. v. Sohm, 15 Utah 
2d 262, 391 P.2d 293 (1964) wherein the Court held: 
Perhaps another way of stating the Rule is that it 
must be proved by a clear preponderance of the 
evidence. If it is clear and preponderates, pre-
sumably it is also convincing . . . 
Id. at 294, P.2d 391 
The general rule that fraud must be affirmatively proved 
by a "clear preponderance of the evidence" does not mean that 
fraud must be established in every case by direct evidence. 
In most cases fraud is proved by reference to the circum-
stances and the legitimate inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn therefrom; or as often stated, fraud may be inferred 
from the circumstances of the transaction. McQuire v. Corbett, 
119, C.A. 2d 244, 259 P.2d 507 (1953); Zimmerman v. Loose, 
162 Colo. 80, 425 P.2d 803 (1967); Carrel v. Lux, 101 Ariz. 
430, 420 P.2d 564 (1966), 37 C.J.S., Fraud, §§ 94-115. 
In the case at Bar several facts warrant mention here. 
1. At trial under examination by Plaintiff's counsel, 
NANCY EGAN at first denied having sexual relations with any 
other man besides GARY EGAN prior to the time she learned of 
her pregnancy (TR.73). However, later after conferring with 
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her own counsel, the same question was put to NANCY EGAN a 
second time, but this time by her own lawyer (TR.77). The 
second time the answer was different and she admitted having 
had sex relations with another man. When asked the name of 
this individual, NANCY EGAN refused to answer the question 
(TR.112); based upon the demeanor and apparent frankness and 
candor of this witness, admittedly it is for the Trial Court 
to determine whether or not that testimony is reliable or even 
believable. However, when the Appellant Court on Equitable 
Review examines the law and the facts such points became relevant. 
2. NANCY EGAN herself testified that GARY EGAN inquired 
on a number of occasions whether the child in gestation was 
his child and she herself testified that she reassured him on 
each and every occasion that the child was in fact his (TR.83). 
Not until September 20, 1974 when the Order and Decree had 
been safely entered did she mention to Plaintiff the possi-
bility that the child was not his (TR.43). Surely if she had 
doubts on September 20, 1974 it is logical to assume that she 
had the same doubts on September 18, 1974, the day before when 
EGAN had signed the SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT and CONSENT TO DEFAULT. 
This point is of primary significance as when GARY EGAN 
asked NANCY if it were his child, she had a duty to disclose 
any doubts she might harbor. Since she did not disclose those 
doubts to GARY EGAN before he signed but waited until the day 
after the Decree was safely entered and the divorce was final, 
it is strong evidence that she willingly, consciously and 
knowingly concealed those facts from him and vitiates any in-
ference or claim of "honest mistake." 
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3. Finally, NANCY EGAN consciously misled both the Court 
and the Plaintiff when she filed her August 5, 1974 Affidavit 
with the Court stating the child was due in February, when 
in reality the child was not due until some two months later, 
at the end of March. Putting the time of conception, in the 
mind of the Plaintiff GARY EGAN at least, safely back during 
the time the parties were living together in wedlock. (Ex. P-ll) 
When the Court views the statements made and the behavior 
of the Defendant NANCY LEE EGAN prior to September 19, 1974, 
in light of all the surrounding circumstances, particularly 
with respect to her statements and behavior on September 20, 
1974 after the Decree was entered, it compels the reasonable 
inference and irrefutable conclusion that when NANCY EGAN 
told GARY there was no question but that the child was his, 
that she knew precisely what she was doing and used it as 
leverage to induce Plaintiff to execute the SETTLEMENT AGREE-
MENT; that the statements made by her were false and she knew 
at the time she made the statements that she had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base her representations as to pa-
ternity. 
Such willful and reckless disregard for the truth or the 
sufficiency of her knowledge, while knowing the Plaintiff was 
strictly relying on the truth of her statements, is precisely 
the kind of "reckless" and wanton behavior described in Pace v. 
Parrish to support a finding by the Court of actionable com-




THE COURT SHOULD GRANT RELIEF FROM THE ENTIRE JUDGMENT AND 
NOT JUST A PORTION THEREOF, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE DIS-
SOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE ITSELF; AS APPELLANT'S CONDUCT CON-
STITUTES EXTRINSIC MISREPRESENTATION. 
At time of trial the Lower Court was uncertain as to how 
much relief should be granted. Fortunately to this question 
there is a quick and easy answer: that is the Court must 
vacate as much of the judgment as justice requires. See, 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 742 (1953); 
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972) (con-
curring opinion of Ellett, J.J. at P. 284 P.2d); Valley Bank 
& Trust v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121 (1974). The case authority 
in Utah is quite clear that the party seeking relief is only 
entitled to relief from the application of the judgment with 
respect to those issues that have not been previously liti-
gated. Here the distinction between "intrinsic" and "ex-
trinsic" facts, misrepresentation and misconduct comes into 
play. In the leading case of Glover v. Glover, 121 Utah 326, 
242 P.2d 298 (1952), the Utah Supreme Court per Chief Justice 
Wolf reversing the Lower Court held that if some act, mis-
representation or misconduct on the part of one party pre-
vented the adverse party from exhibiting fully his case, by 
fraud or deception, keeping him away from court or by a 
"false promise of compromise" and for that reason there has 
never been a real contest, then this is classified as extrinsic 
misconduct and the injured party is entitled to relief from 
judgment and to have his day in court on those issues. 
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If on the other hand the fraud, misrepresentation, or 
misconduct goes to some issue that has been litigated or upon 
which a trial has been had, then it is denominated as "in-
trinsic" fraud or misconduct and the parties are not again 
entitled to be heard on those issues. Haner v. Haner, 13 
Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962). The policy reason for 
this concept is that a trial on an issue should put an end 
to the controversy involving the issue, whereas if an indi-
vidual by reason of the misconduct of his opponent is pre-
vented from or relinquishes his opportunity to present some 
issue to judicial determination, he has not had his day in 
court or been afforded his right of "due process" of law on 
those issues. The Court's holding in the Glover case that 
the aggrieved party was entitled to a new trial on all issues 
not previously litigated was recently affirmed in Clissold 
v, Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241 (1974). Justice 
Crockett suggested the Rule was even less restrictive in the 
Haner case, supra, where he commented: 
"It is sometimes said that when a judgment is 
attacked collaterally on the ground that it was 
obtained by fraud or deceit it will be set aside 
only for extrinsic fraud. But we are in accord 
with the indications in the Restatement of Judg-
ments that this is too limited. It seems more 
realistic to say that when it appears that the 
processes of justice have been so completely 
thwarted or distorted as to persuade the court 
that in fairness and good conscience the judgment 
should not be permitted to stand, relief should 
be granted. . . . Inasmuch as the parties and 
their witnesses were present and these issues were 
contested during the trial, if there were in fact 
misrepresentations and fraud, as plaintiff claims, 
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they would have occurred within the trial it-
self (thus intrinsic to it) and therefore would 
not have been of the type of fraud characterized 
as extrinsic fraud, explained above." (Id. at 
13 Utah 2d 300.) 
Applying the law to the facts of the present case, the 
Plaintiff GARY EGAN was induced by NANCY1s representations 
to sign both a STIPULATION & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT and a WAIVER, 
APPEARANCE & CONSENT TO DEFAULT; laboring at the time under 
the belief he had a legal and moral responsibility to sup-
port his wife and children, all such representations and 
events took place outside the court room. NANCY's repre-
sentations had the effect of keeping GARY outside of court 
as under the facts as represented to him there was no question 
or contest as to paternity. Had the misrepresentations not 
been made, no AGREEMENT to support nor CONSENT TO DEFAULT 
would have been entered and GARY would have had his day in 
Court. Because of the misrepresentations of fact made to 
him by NANCY he waived his right to appear and litigate 
and no trial was had on any issue. Dausuel v. Dausuel, 195 
Fed. 2d 774 (1952). It does not seem to advance the cause 
of justice to hold that if a party can use the Court as an 
instrumentality of her fraud, then the injured party is barred 
forever from using the Court in seeking redress. If this 
were the case one would not seek judicial resolution of dis-
putes but assiduously avoid it. No trial or hearing was ever 
had upon the merits of this claim and all issues contained in 
the Judgment and Decree of September 19, 1974 came in via Stipu-
lation and Settlement Agreement and therefore went uncontested. 
In light of the surrounding facts and the nature of the mis-
representations, GARY EGAN is entitled to relief from the 
entire economic portion of judgment as a matter of law* 
Clissold v. Clissold, supra, and Glover v. Glover, supra, 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY HOSPITAL 
EXPENSES INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD 
AND EXPERT WITNESS FEES INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH BLOOD 
TESTS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL PROVING THE CHILD WAS NOT HIS. 
1. The hospital expenses cannot possibly be determined 
to be family expenses. 
The Trial Court erred in refusing to relieve GARY EGAN 
from payment of the $900.00 in hospital expenses incurred 
in connection with the birth of the child Melinda. The Court 
admittedly has some discretion here, but the Trial Court 
specifically found, and the reason it gave for failure to grant 
relief was that the hospital expenses incurred for the birth 
of the child were "family expenses". 
The Court's conclusion totally overlooks the fact that 
the child was not GARY EGAN's child and therefore not an 
expense of his family nor were such expenses incurred during 
the marriage. 
Section 30-2-9 Utah Code Annotated (2dRepl.Vol.3,1976) states: 
FAMILY EXPENSES—JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY.— 
The expenses of the family and the education of 
the children are chargeable upon the property of 
both husband and wife or of either of them, and 
in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or 
separately. 
However Section 30-2-5 Utah Code Annotated (2dRepl.Vol.3 
1976) states: 
SEPARATE DEBTS BEFORE AND AFTER MARRIAGE.—Neither 
husband nor wife is liable for the debts or liabilities 
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of the other incurred before marriage, and, 
except as herein otherwise declared, they are 
not- liable for the debts of each other contracted 
after marriage; nor are the wages, earnings or 
property of either, or the rents or income of 
the property of either, liable for the separate 
debts of the other. (Emphasis added) 
The divorce became final and absolute upon entry of the 
Decree (R.6). Since the Decree was entered on September 19, 
1974 (R.12) and since the hospital expenses were not incurred 
until March 2 8, 19 75, long after the marriage had been dissolved, 
the hospital expenses cannot possibly be legally determined 
to be a "family expense". 
2. The Trial Court erred in failing to grant the 
Plaintiff his expert witness costs in proving true paternity. 
Although the Trial Court ordered three separate and 
independent blood tests to be used in connection with the 
proof of paternity at time of trial, (R.24,70,72) and though 
the Plaintiff GARY EGAN prevailed on the issue of paternity 
at trial (R.134 114) , the Court refused to grant Respondent 
his costs incurred for blood group examination and expert 
witness fees to prove paternity at time of trial. (R.157). 
§§ 78-25-18, et. seg., Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975) 
Utah's Evidence Code on Blood Tests in Civil Suits where 
paternity if a factor reads as follows: 
78-25-18. BLOOD TESTS FOR CHILD AND ALLEGED PARENTS 
IN CIVIL ACTION AND BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH 
PARENTAGE IS A RELEVANT FACT.—In any civil action 
or in bastardy proceedings in which the parentage 
of a person is a relevant fact, the court shall order 
the child and alleged parents to submit to blood tests. 
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78-25-19. BLOOD TEST—WHO TO MAKE.--The test 
may be made by no more than three qualified 
examiners of blood types, not restricted to 
physicians, who shall be appointed by the 
court . . . 
78-25-20. EXAMINER AS WITNESS.—The court shall 
call the examiner as a witness to testify to his 
findings, and the examiner is subject to cross-
examination by the parties . . . 
78-25-21. ADMISSIBILITY OF RESULTS IN EVI-
DENCE.—The results of the tests shall be re-
ceived in evidence where the conclusion of all 
examiners, as disclosed by the tests, is that 
the alleged father is not the actual father of 
the child, and the question of paternity shall 
be so resolved. . . . 
78-25-23. COSTS OF EXAMINATION.--The court 
shall determine the reasonable compensation to 
be paid to an examiner appointed by the court, 
and, in its discretion, may order that the parties 
pay the costs in such proportions as it shall 
prescribe . . . 
As described above, the Court ordered two blood group 
analyses pursuant to Plaintiff's motion, both of which 
positively excluded Plaintiff from possible paternity. 
The Plaintiff incurred expenses in the sum of $801.50 in 
connection with these tests. (See Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements, R.169) 
Originally the Court granted these costs to Plaintiff 
GARY EGAN (R.139)(169), then later on motion of the De-
fendant NANCY EGAN, the Court reduced the award by $795.00. 
Unquestionably, the Court has a certain degree of 
discretion in awarding costs, but in the case at Bar, the 
Court was not concerned with the attendant equities, but 
expressed concern with the Defendant's ability to pay costs. 
Such a finding constitutes an abuse of discretion as the 
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respective party's ability to pay should never enter into 
the question of whether a party is entitled to judgment. 
Elsewise General Motors could never be awarded a judgment. 
On appeal, the Cross Appellant seeks an order from 
this Court directing the Trial Court to grant further re-
lief from judgment which presently orders him to pay $900.00 
in hospital bills for Melinda Egan and $795-00 in expert 
(blood test) witness costs. 
POINT VIII 
GARY EGAN IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST NANCY EGAN FOR ALL 
DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY HIM RESULTING FROM HER INCORRECT STATE-
MENTS. 
The Trial Court denied recovery of compensatory damages 
to GARY EGAN on grounds that the injuries complained of oc-
curred during the marriage and that in Utcih a husband may 
not recover damages from his wife (R.136 117). The Court 
missed the fact that the money was paid to NANCY after the 
divorce had become final. As the Court granted partial 
rescission from the Settlement Agreement it would follow 
that Plaintiff would be entitled to restitution of all 
monies paid pursuant to the Agreement before it was rescinded• 
This is provided by § 30-2-6 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 
3, 1976), which reads as follows: 
ACTIONS BASED ON PROPERTY RIGHTS.—Should the 
husband or wife obtain possession or control 
of property belonging to the other before or 
after marriage the owner of the property may 
maintain an action therefor, or for any right 
growing out of the same/ in the same manner 
and to the same extent as if they were un~ 
married. 
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The Cross Appellant is aware of the case of Rubalcaua 
v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), but sub-
mits that case is totally in inapposite to the case at Bar. 
The Supreme Court should overrule the Trial Court's finding 
that the doctrine of Intra Family Immunity applies in the 
case at Bar by virtue of the Utah Married Woman's Act 
§ 30-2-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953) and because 
the parties were not married when the injury occurred. 
Plaintiff is legally entitled to restitution from NANCY 
for the money paid prior to rescission of the Settlement 
Agreement. 
POINT IX 
TO REQUIRE GARY EGAN TO PAY SUPPORT FOR A CHILD JUDICIALLY 
PROVED NOT TO BE HIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW. 
The only time that the issue of paternity was liti-
gated in an adversarial hearing was when Plaintiff brought 
his Rule 60(b) action for relief from judgment. At that 
hearing the evidence was conclusive and uncontroverted that 
the child Melinda was not GARY'S child. To require GARY 
EGAN to pay further support for this child would violate 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. 
Ed.2d 225 (1971); Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 671, 
93 S. Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed.2d 583 (1973); Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940. 
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CONCLUSION 
The case before the Court on Appeal is not one where the 
parties are bitterly attempting to vindicate their emotional 
injuries or assuage damaged egos at the children's expense. 
This case is simply one where a dutiful estranged husband 
acted over zealously in his attempts to save his marriage by 
conciliating his wife in a Settlement Agreement in hopes of 
ultimate reconciliation. Without question he acted impru-
dently in signing an Agreement to pay hospital bills and 
child support for his wife's expected child; but it does not 
seem unreasonable that in his then present frame of mind 
that he would be reticent to charge his wife with adultery 
or reluctant to go into Court to contest the legitimacy of 
her child, when all the while she assured him that the child 
she was carrying was his child, and when he had no reason 
to doubt her. After NANCY gave birth to a child from whose 
physical appearance GARY obviously could not have fathered, 
GARY acted promptly to correct his error. As the child was 
not born until some six months after the Divorce Decree was 
entered, there was no reasonable way that GARY could have 
determined paternity prior to birth; as no one would suggest 
endangering the mother or child with prenatal blood tests 
before the child was born. 
The Respondent simply cannot conceive that it would be 
fair or just for the Court to order him to pay $27,000.00 to 
support another man's child. The Trial Court also 
believed that Equity and Justice would be better served 
if GARY were released from the future applica-
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tion of the support judgment and set that portion of the 
Decree aside. Presumably, NANCY can seek support of her 
child from the child's natural father, the man who justly 
should support the child. 
On cross appeal, it would seem here that the Trial 
Court was too generous and too compassionate with NANCY in 
allowing all other terms of the Divorce Decree to stand. 
Those issues were never litigated and are not res adjudicata. 
The Settlement Agreement and Decree were unquestionably 
based entirely upon false premises that NANCY had been a 
true and faithful wife and that GARY had both a legal and 
moral obligation to support his family. Surely had GARY 
been advised of the true state of the facts and the real 
reason why his wife was leaving him, he would not have 
struck such an unconscionable bargain. Because NANCY was 
able to use the Court as an instrument of her misrepre-
sentation should not, in all good conscience, preclude for-
ever a remedy from the wrong. The Case should now be re-
ferred to the Domestic Relations Division for a hearing on 
the merits of the case with all parties now fully under-
standing the true facts. 
Finally, the Court on equitable review should overrule 
the Trial Courtfs failure to relieve GARY from $900.00 in 
hospital bills, $795.00 in expert witness fees and order 
restitution to GARY of the $1,800.00 paid to date to NANCY 
for the support of Melinda. If the law is to be a means to 
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achieve justice and not merely a mechanism to serve itself, 
then justice must be done between the parbies and GARY EGAN 
must be fully relieved from a Divorce Decree never before 
litigated and based entirely upon 
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